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Abstract—We study auction-theoretic scheduling in cellular
networks as a means to enable such value declarations. Our anal-
ysis is based on using the idea of mean field equilibrium (MFE).
Here, agents model their opponents through a distribution over
their action spaces and play the best response. The system is at
an MFE if this action is itself a sample drawn from the assumed
distribution. In our setting, the agents are smart phone apps
that generate service requests, experience waiting costs, and bid
for service from base stations. We show that if we conduct a
second-price auction at each base station, there exists an MFE
that would schedule the app with the (weighted) longest queue
at each time. The result suggests that auctions can attain the
same desirable results as queue-length-based scheduling with full
information. We present results on the asymptotic convergence
of a system with a finite number of agents to the mean field
case, and conclude with simulation results illustrating the ease
of computation of the MFE.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has recently been a rapid increase in the use of
smart hand-held devices for Internet access. These devices
are supported by cellular data networks, which carry the
packets generated by apps running on these smart devices.
These apps can be modeled as queues that arrive when the
user starts the app, and depart when the user terminates that
app. Packets generated by an app are buffered in a queue
corresponding to that app. Queueing delays impact the quality
of user experience (QoE) based on the app being used. Users
move around cells that each has a base station, and scheduling
a particular user provides service to the queue that represents
his/her currently running app. User interest could shift from
app to app, regardless of whether or not there are buffered
packets. Hence, a queue might terminate and be replaced by
a new one even if there are jobs waiting for service.
An important problem in cellular data networks is that for
scheduling, i.e., determining which queues receive service at
each time instant. Most work on scheduling has focused on
the case of a finite number of infinitely long lived flows,
with the objective being to maximize the total throughput. A
seminal piece of work under this paradigm introduced the so-
called max-weight algorithm [1]. Here, the drift of a quadratic
Lyapunov function is minimized by maximizing the queue-
length weighted sum of acceptable schedules. Later work (e.g.,
[2], [3], [4]) has used a similar approach in a variety of
network scenarios. If queues arrive and depart, then a natural
scheduling policy in the single server case is a Longest-Queue-
First (LQF) scheme, in which each server serves the longest of
the queues requesting service from it. LQF has many attractive
properties, such a minimizing the expected value of the longest
queue in the system.
The above approach assumes that the queue length values
are given to the scheduler, and that it is aware of the function
that maps the queue-length to cost on QoE of queueing.
However, while the downlink queue lengths would naturally
be available at a cellular base station, the only way to obtain
uplink queue information is to ask the users themselves.
However, a larger value of queue length results in a higher
probability of being scheduled under all the above policies,
implying an incentive to lie.
An appealing idea is to use a pricing scheme to inform
scheduling decisions for cellular data access. These prices
could be in the form of tokens issued by the cellular service
provider that are used as currency in the service market. An
example of a pricing approach is presented in [5], which
describes an experimental trial of a system in which day-ahead
prices are announced to users, who then decide on whether or
not to use their 3G service based on the price at that time.
However, these prices have to be determined through trial and
error. Can we determine prices by using an auction?
Our key objective is to design an incentive compatible
scheduling scheme that behaves in a (weighted) LQF-like
fashion. We consider a system in which each app bids for
service from the base station that it is currently connected
to. The auction is conducted in a second-price fashion, with
the winner being the app that bids highest, and the charge
being the value of the second highest bid. It is well known
that such an auction promotes truth-telling [6]. Would the
scheduling decisions resulting from such auctions resemble
that of LQF? Would conducting such an auction repeatedly
over time with queues arriving and departing result in some
form of equilibrium?
Mean Field Games
We investigate the existence of an equilibrium using the the-
ory of Mean Field Games (MFG) [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12],
[13]. In MFG, the players assume that each opponent would
play an action drawn independently from a fixed distribution
over its action space. The player then chooses an action that
is the best response against actions drawn in this fashion. We
say that the system is at Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE) if this
best response action is itself a sample drawn from the assumed
distribution.
The MFG framework offers a structure to approximate so-
called Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in dynamic games.
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2PBE requires each player to keep track of their beliefs on the
future plays of every other opponent in the system, and play
the best response to that belief. This makes the computation
of PBE intractable when the number of players is large. The
MFG framework simplifies computation of the best response,
and often turns out to be asymptotically optimal.
Work on MFGs has mostly focused on showing the exis-
tence, accuracy and stability of MFE [7], [8], [9], [10]. In the
space of queueing systems, some recent work considers the
game of sampling a number of queues and joining one [11].
However, ours is a scheduling problem in queueing system
interacting with an auction system, which we believe is unique.
In the space of applications, Iyer et al. [12] study advertisers
competing via a second price auction for spots on a webpage.
The bid must lie in a finite real interval, and the winner
can place an ad on the webpage. With time, the advertisers
learn about the value of winning (probability of making a
sale). Li et al. [13] consider the problem of mechanism
design for truthful state revelation (number of packets at each
station) in a wireless D2D streaming system. Their main result
is to generalize the Groves mechanism to the mean field
regime. Both use some version of fixed point theorem to show
existence of the MFE.
Neither of the above consider the use of auctions for service
scheduling in queueing systems, which is the basis of our
problem. In our setup, the state is the queue with arrivals and
departures, and we allow bids to lie in the full positive real
line. These considerations result in significant technical work
to show existence and characterize the MFE. In an earlier
version of this work [14], we presented a preliminary version
of our work without proofs. The current work highlights the
methodological contributions.
Overview of Paper
We introduce the Mean Field Game (MFG) in Section II.
Here, a selected agent (app) has a belief ρ about the bid
distribution of the other agents, and assumes that their bids
will be drawn independently from this distribution. The state
of the agent is its current queue length, and it faces a per-time
step cost that is a function of its queue length, which models
the impact on QoE of queueing delay. The agent must place
a bid based on the belief and its current state and belief about
other agents.
We consider the problem of determining the cost minimiz-
ing bid function and the corresponding value function as a
Markov Decision Process in Section III. We show that the
Bellman operator corresponding to the MDP is a contraction
mapping with a unique minimum, implying that value iteration
would converge to the best response bid. Further, we show that
the best response bid is monotone increasing in queue length.
We call the bid distribution across agents that results from
playing the best responses as γ.
We next prove the existence of the MFE in Sections IV–
V by verifying the conditions of the Schauder Fixed Point
Theorem. We need to show that the mapping between the
assumed bid distribution ρ to the resultant bid distribution γ
is continuous, and that the space in which γ lies is contained
in a compact subset of the space from which ρ is drawn. In
order to do this, we first show that the mapping between
ρ and best response bid function is continuous, and then
show that the map between ρ and the state (queue length)
distribution is continuous. Putting these together yields the
required continuity conditions. We then verify the conditions
of the Arzela`-Ascoli Theorem for showing compactness.
We show in Section VI that the MFE in our case is an
asymptotically accurate approximation of a PBE. The result
follows from the fact that any finite subset of agents is unlikely
to have interacted with any of the others as the number of
agents becomes large. Finally, we present simulation results
in Section VII, showing that MFE computation is straightfor-
ward.
Discussion: In the case of a single cost function (homo-
geneous QoE for all apps) the best response bid function
is monotone increasing in the queue length regardless of ρ.
This implies that the service regime corresponding to MFE is
identical to LQF (or a weighted version if we have different
QoE classes for apps). Further, our simulations suggest that if
the base stations were to compute the empirical bid distribution
and return it to the users, the eventual bid distribution would
be the MFE. Thus, the desirable properties of LQF are a
natural result of auction-based scheduling, while the queue
length distribution would be that generated by LQF.
II. MEAN FIELD GAME MODEL
We consider a system consisting of N cells and NM agents
(apps), which are randomly permuted in these cells at each
time instant, with each cell having exactly M agents1. The
model is consistent on the likely evolution of the 5G cellular
system, wherein we expect a large number of small, dense cells
and much user mobility across different cells. The mobility
model is identical to the basic framework used in work on
mobile wireless networks [15]. Each cell contains a base
station, which conducts a second price auction to choose which
agent to serve. Each agent must choose its bid in response to
its state and its belief over the bids of its competitors.
Figure 1 illustrates the MFG approximation, which is accu-
rate in the limit as N becomes large. An MFG is described
from the perspective of a single candidate agent i, which
assumes that the actions of all its competitors are drawn
independently from some distribution. The asymptotic accu-
racy of the independence assumption follows from a standard
argument on the propagation of chaos whose details are
provided in Section VI. In Figure 1, the auction (shown as
blue/dark tiles) and the queue dynamics (shown as beige/light
tiles). Since we focus on a single agent, we do not need to
specify its identity explicitly, unless we wish to compare its
actions with those of other agents. Hence, we will drop the
index i where possible for ease of notation.
Auction System: At each time step k, the agent of interest
competes in a second price auction against M−1 other agents,
whose bids are assumed to be independently drawn from a
continuous, finite mean (cumulative) bid distribution ρ, with
1Note that our results are essentially unchanged if M is an independent
random variable with finite support.
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Fig. 1. The game consists of an auction part (blue/dark tiles) and a queue
dynamics part (beige/light tiles). The system is at MFE if the distribution of
the bid X is equal to the assumed bid distribution ρ.
support R+. The state of the agent is its current queue length
q (the random variable is represented by Q). The queue length
induces a holding cost C(q), where C(.) is a strictly convex
and increasing function. The cost function could be one of a
finite set of cost functions, modeling the impact on QoE of
queueing for the currently running app for that agent. However,
since the analysis is identical for one or a finite set of cost
functions, we focus on the single cost function in the analysis
below. We will discuss the (very minor) changes that result
with multiple cost functions in Section VIII.
Suppose that the agent bids an amount x ∈ R+. The
outcomes of the second price auction are that the agent would
obtain one unit of service with probability pρ(x) and would
have to pay an expected amount of rρ(x) when all the other
bids are drawn independently from ρ. Further, the queue has
future job arrivals according to distribution Φ, with the random
job size being denoted by A. Finally, the app can terminate
at any time instant with probability 1 − β. Based on these
inputs, the agent needs to determine the value of its current
state Vˆρ(q), and the best response bid to make x = θˆρ(q). The
assumption that only a single unit of service is provided at each
base station is for simplicity of notation, and our results are
unchanged if we are allowed to choose some M˜ < M agents
as winners in each auction. The mechanism followed would
be a M˜ + 1th price auction in that case.
Queueing System: The queueing dynamics are driven by
the arrival process Φ and the probability of obtaining a unit
of service being pρ(x) as described above. When the user
terminates an app, he/she immediately starts a fresh app, i.e.,
a new queue takes the place of a departing queue. The initial
condition of this new queue R is drawn from a regeneration
distribution Ψ, whose support is R+. The invariant distribution
associated with this queueing system (if it exists) is denoted
Πρ.
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. At each time k, the arrivals {Ak} are i.i.d
random variables distributed according to Φ. We assume that
Ak ∈ [0, {A}], where A¯ is finite. Also, these random variables
have a bounded density function, φ (i.e., ||φ‖ < cφ, where ||.||
is the sup norm).
Assumption 2. The regeneration values {Rk} are i.i.d random
variables distributed according to Ψ, and they have a bounded
density ψ (i.e., ‖ψ‖ < cψ, where ||.|| is the sup norm).
Assumption 3. The holding cost function C : R+ 7→ R+
is continuous, increasing and strictly convex. We also assume
that C is O(qm) for some integer m.
The polynomial form above is for technical reasons, but
is not very restrictive since many convex functions can be
approximated quite well.
Mean Field Equilibrium: The probability that the agent’s
bid lies in the interval [0, x] is equal to the probability that
the agent’s queue length lies in some set whose best response
is to bid between [0, x]. Thus, the probability of the bid lying
in the interval [0, x] is Πρ(θˆ−1ρ ([0, x])), which we define as
γ(x). According to the assumed (cumulative) bid distribution,
the probability of the same event is ρ(x). If ρ(x) = γ(x), it
means that the assumed bid distribution is consistent with the
best response bid distribution, and we have an MFE.
A. Agent’s decision problem
Let the candidate be agent i. Suppose that the belief over
the bid of a random agent has cumulative distribution ρ. We
assume that ρ ∈ P where,
P = {G|G is a continuous c.d.f,
∫
(1−G(x))dx < E},
for some E <∞, to be defined later. Besides, its current state,
the information available with the agent about the market at
any time prior to the auction only includes the following:
1) The bids it made in each previous auction from last
regeneration.
2) The auctions that it won.
3) The payments made for the auctions won.
Let Hi,k be the history vector containing the above information
available to agent i at time k. Suppose that the random variable
representing the bid made by agent i at time k is denoted by
Xi,k, with the realized value being xi,k. Also, let X¯−i,k =
maxj∈Mi,k Xj,k, represent the maximum value of M−1 draws
from the distribution ρ. Thus, X¯−i,k is the value of the highest
opposing bid. The agent’s decision problem is to choose a bid
function θi, which maps its available information to a bid at
each time xi,k.
Since the time of regeneration T ki is a geometric random
variable, the expected cost of agent i can be written as
Vi,ρ(Hi,k; θi) = E
[ ∞∑
t=k
βt[C(Qi,t) + rρ(Xi,t)]
]
, (1)
where the expectation is over future state evolutions. By
replacing the belief with ρ, we have made an agent’s deci-
sion problem independent of other agents’ strategies. Hence,
we represent the cost by Vi,ρ(Hi,k; θi). Also, rρ(x) =
E[X¯−i,kI{X¯−i,k ≤ x}] is the expected payment when i bids
x under the assumption that the bids of other agents are
distributed according to ρ. Hence, given ρ, the win probability
in the auction is
pρ(x) = P(X¯−i,k ≤ x) = ρ(x)M−1. (2)
4The expected payment when bidding x is
rρ(x) = E[X¯−i,kI{X¯−i,k ≤ x}]
= xpρ(x)−
∫ x
0
pρ(u)du. (3)
The state process Qi,k is Markov and has a transition kernel
P(Qi,k+1 ∈ B|Qi,k = q,Xi,k = x) =
βpρ(x)P((q − 1)+ +Ak ∈ B) (4)
+ β(1− pρ(x))P(q +Ak ∈ B) + (1− β)Ψ(B),
where B ⊆ R+ is a Borel set and x+ , max(x, 0). Recall
that Ak ∼ Φ is the arrival between (k)th and (k+1)th auction
and Ψ is density function of the regeneration process. In the
above expression, the first term corresponds to the event that
agent wins the auction at time k, while the second corresponds
to the event that it does not. The last term captures the event
that the agent regenerates after auction k. The agent’s decision
problem can be modeled as an infinite horizon discounted cost
MDP. It can be shown that there exists an optimal Markov
deterministic policy for our MDP [16]. Then, from (1), the
optimal value function of the agent is
Vˆi,ρ(q) = inf
θi∈Θ
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
βt[C(Qi,t) + rρ(Xi,t)] |Qi,0 = q
]
, (5)
where Θ is the space of Markov deterministic policies.
Note that user index is redundant in the above expression
as we are concerned with a single agent’s decision problem.
In future notations, we will omit the user subscript i.
B. Invariant distribution
Given cumulative bid distribution ρ and a Markov policy
θ ∈ Θ, the transition kernel given by (4) can be re-written as,
P(Qk+1 ∈ B|Qk = q) =
βpρ(θ(q))P((q − 1)+ +Ak ∈ B) (6)
+ β(1− pρ(θ(q)))P(q +Ak ∈ B) + (1− β)Ψ(B).
Then, we have an important result in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The Markov chain described by the transition
probabilities in (6) is positive Harris recurrent and has a
unique invariant distribution.
Proof: From (6) we note that, P(Qk+1 ∈ B|Qk = q) ≥
(1−β)Ψ(B), where 0 < β < 1 and Ψ is a probability measure.
The result then follows from results in Chapter 12, Meyn and
Tweedie [17].
We denote the unique invariant distribution by Πρ,θ.
C. Mean field equilibrium
As described in the Introduction, the mean field equilibrium
requires the consistency check that the bid distribution γ
induced by the invariant distribution Πρ,θρ should be equal
to the bid distribution conjectured by the agent, i.e., ρ. Thus,
we have the following definition of MFE:
Definition 1 (Mean field equilibrium). Let ρ be a bid distri-
bution and θρ be a stationary policy for an agent. Then, we
say that (ρ, θρ) constitutes a mean field equilibrium if
1) θρ is an optimal policy of the decision problem in (5),
given bid distribution ρ; and
2) ρ(x) = γ(x) , Πρ(θ−1ρ ([0, x])),∀x ∈ R+, where Πρ =
Πρ,θρ .
Note that the game theoretic definition of the MFE
considers the existence of an invariant distribution at a fixed
time as the number of agents becomes asymptotically large.
In keeping with extending the ideas of a Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium to the system with a large number of agents,
the definition does not require the occupancy distribution to
converge to the invariant distribution from an arbitrary initial
condition as time becomes large [12], [13], [9]. The approach
may be contrasted with the stochastic systems literature that
often studies the mean field in the case where both the number
of controllers and time go to infinity (in some order), but the
control policy is fixed (not a best response), and the objective
is to show that interchanging limits of time and number of
particles produces the same steady state distribution [18].
A main result of this work is showing the existence of an
MFE.
III. PROPERTIES OF OPTIMAL BID FUNCTION
The decision problem given by (5) is an infinite horizon,
discounted Markov decision problem. The optimality equation
or Bellman equation corresponding to the decision problem is
Vˆρ(q) = C(q) + βEA(Vˆρ(q +A)) + inf
x∈R+
[rρ(x)
−pρ(x)βEA
(
Vˆρ(q +A)− Vˆ ρ((q − 1)+ +A)
)]
, (7)
where A ∼ Φ, and we use the notation max(0, z) = z+. Note
that the decision problem above is independent of the regen-
eration distribution Ψ, since the game simply ends at any time
with probability 1−β from the agent’s perspective. However,
from a system perspective, the Markov chain describing the
state transition is correctly represented by (6).
Define the set of functions
V =
{
f : R+ 7→ R+ : sup
q∈R+
∣∣∣∣ f(q)w(q)
∣∣∣∣ <∞
}
, (8)
where w(q) = max{C(q), 1}. Note that V is a Banach space
with w-norm,
‖f‖w = sup
q∈R+
∣∣∣∣ f(q)w(q)
∣∣∣∣ <∞.
Also, define the operator Tρ as
(Tρf)(q) = C(q) + βEAf(q +A) + inf
x∈R+
[rρ(x)
−pρ(x)β(EA(f(q +A)− f((q − 1)+ +A)))
]
, (9)
where f ∈ V . It is straightforward to show that the infimum
in the above operator occurs at
β∆f(q)+, (10)
5where ∆f(q) = EA(f(q + A) − f((q − 1)+ + A)). Then,
substituting from (2), (3) and (10), (9) can be rewritten as
(Tρf)(q) = C(q) + βEAf(q +A)−
∫ β∆f(q)+
0
pρ(u)du.
(11)
The following lemma characterizes the optimal solution.
Lemma 2. Given a cumulative bid distribution ρ,
1) There exists a j ∈ N such that T jρ : V → V is
a contraction mapping. Hence, there exists a unique
f∗ρ ∈ V such that Tρf∗ρ = f∗ρ , and for any f ∈ V ,
Tnρ f → f∗ρ as n→∞.
2) The fixed point f∗ρ of operator Tρ is the unique solution
to the optimality equation (7), i.e., f∗ρ = Vˆρ.
3) Let, θˆρ(q) = β∆Vˆρ(q)+. Then, θˆρ is an optimal policy.
Proof: The proof is similar to Theorem 8.3.6 in [19].
An exception to be noted here is that the action space in our
case is not a compact set which violates Assumption 8.3.1(a)
in [19]. However, this assumption can be overridden if the
statement of Lemma 8.3.8(a) in [19] holds true. This applies
to our case since, as derived in (10), a minimizer exists for the
infimum operator in (9) for every q. Further, Theorem 8.3.6
is specified with j = 1 (a one-step contraction). Hence, we
replace Assumption 8.3.2(b) with an appropriate condition to
obtain a j−step contraction. Please refer to Appendix A for
details.
Corollary 3. An optimal policy of the agent’s decision prob-
lem (5) is given by
θˆρ(q) = βEA
[
Vˆρ(q +A)− Vˆρ((q − 1)+ +A)
]
.
We now establish that Vˆρ and θˆρ are continuous and
increasing functions.
Lemma 4. Given a cumulative bid distribution function ρ
1) Vˆρ is a continuous increasing function.
2) θˆρ is a continuous strictly increasing function.
Proof: Let f ∈ V . Suppose f is a continuous monotone
increasing function. We first prove that Tρf is also continuous
monotone increasing function. Since, Tnρ f → Vˆρ according to
Statement 2 of Lemma 2, we conclude that Vˆρ also has the
same property.
Let q > q′. Then,
Tρf(q)− Tρf(q′) = C(q)− C(q′)
+ βEA(f(q +A)− f(q′ +A))
+ inf
x
[rρ(x)− βpρ(x)EA(f(q +A)− f((q − 1)+ +A))]
− inf
x
[rρ(x)− βpρ(x)EA(f(q′ +A)− f((q′ − 1)+ +A))]
(a)
≥ βEA(f(q +A)− f(q′ +A))
+ β inf
x
[
pρ(x)EA(f(q′ +A)− f((q′ − 1)+ +A)
−f(q +A) + f((q − 1)+ +A))]
≥ βmin {EA(f(q +A)− f(q′ +A)),
EA(f((q − 1)+ +A)− f((q′ − 1)+ +A))
} (b)≥ 0,
where (a) follows from the assumption that C(.) is an increas-
ing function, and (b) follows from the assumption that f(.) is
an increasing function.
To prove that Tρf is continuous consider a sequence
{qn} such that qn → q. Since f is a continuous function,
f(qn + a) → f(q + a). Then, by using dominated conver-
gence theorem, we have EAf(qn + A) → EAf(q + A) and
EAf((qn−1)++A)→ EAf((q−1)++A). Also, ∆f(qn) ≥ 0
as f is an increasing function. Then, from (11), we get that
Tρf(qn) = C(qn) + βEAf(qn +A)−
∫ β∆f(qn)
0
pρ(u)du
→ C(q) + βEAf(q +A)−
∫ β∆f(q)
0
pρ(u)du = Tρf(q).
Hence, Tρf is a continuous function. This yields Statement 1
in the lemma.
Now, to prove the second part, assume that ∆f is an
increasing function. First, we show that ∆Tρf is an increasing
function. Let q > q′. From (11), for any a < A¯ we can write
(Tρf)(q + a)− (Tρf)((q − 1)+ + a)
− (Tρf)(q′ + a) + (Tρf)((q′ − 1)+ + a)
=C(q + a)− C((q − 1)+ + a)
− C(q′ + a) + C((q′ − 1)+ + a)
+ βEAf(q + a+A)− βEAf((q − 1)+ + a+A)
− βEAf(q′ + a+A) + βEAf((q′ − 1)+ + a+A)
−
∫ β∆f(q+a)
β∆f(q′+a)
pρ(u) du+
∫ β∆f((q−1)++a)
β∆f((q′−1)++a)
pρ(u) du
=C(q + a)− C((q − 1)+ + a)
− C(q′ + a) + C((q′ − 1)+ + a)
+ βEAf((q + a− 1)+ +A)− βEAf((q − 1)+ + a+A)
− βEAf((q′ + a− 1)+ +A) + βEAf((q′ − 1)+ + a+A)
+
∫ β∆f(q+a)
β∆f(q′+a)
1− pρ(u) du+
∫ β∆f((q−1)++a)
β∆f((q′−1)++a)
pρ(u) du
It can be easily verified that EA(f(q+a−1)++A)−EA(f(q−
1)+ +a+A)−EA(f(q′+a−1)+ +A)+EA(f(q′−1)+ +a+
A) ≥ 0 as f is increasing (due to Statement 1 of this lemma).
From the assumption that ∆f is increasing, the last two terms
in the above expression are also non-negative. Now, taking
expectation on both sides, we obtain ∆Tρf(q)−∆Tρf(q′) ≥
∆C(q)−∆C(q′) > 0. Therefore, from Statements 2 and 3 of
Lemma 2, we have
θˆρ(q)− θˆρ(q′) = ∆Vˆρ(q)−∆Vˆρ(q′) ≥ ∆C(q)−∆C(q′) > 0.
Here, the last inequality holds since C is a strictly convex
increasing function.
IV. EXISTENCE OF MFE
The main result showing the existence of MFE is as follows.
Theorem 5. There exists an MFE (ρ, θˆρ) such that
ρ(x) = γ(x) , Πρ
(
θˆ−1ρ [0, x]
)
,∀x ∈ R+.
6We first introduce some useful notation. Let Θ = {θ : R 7→
R, supq∈R+
∣∣∣ θ(q)w(q) ∣∣∣ <∞}. Note that Θ is a normed space with
w-norm. Also, let Ω be the space of absolutely continuous
probability measures on R+. We endow this probability space
with the topology of weak convergence. Note that this is
same as the topology of point-wise convergence of continuous
cumulative distribution functions.
We define θ∗ : P 7→ Θ as (θ∗(ρ))(q) = θˆρ(q), where
θˆρ(q) is the optimal bid given by Corollary 3. It can easily
verified that θˆρ ∈ Θ. Also, define the mapping Π∗ that takes a
bid distribution ρ to the invariant workload distribution Πρ(·).
Later, using Lemma 8 we will show that Πρ(·) ∈ Ω. Therefore,
Π∗ : P → Ω. Finally, define F as (F(ρ))(x) = γ(x) =
Πρ(θˆ
−1
ρ ([0, x])). Lemma 11 will show that F maps P into
itself.
Now to prove the above theorem we need to show that F
has a fixed point, i.e F(ρ) = ρ.
Theorem 6 (Schauder Fixed Point Theorem). Suppose
F(P) ⊂ P . If F(·) is continuous, and F(P) is contained
in a convex and compact subset of P , then F(·) has a fixed
point.
In next section, we show that the mapping F satisfies the
conditions of the above theorem, and hence it has a fixed point.
Note that P is a convex set. Therefore, we just need to show
that the other two conditions are satisfied.
V. MFE EXISTENCE: PROOF
A. Continuity of the map F
To prove the continuity of mapping F , we first show that θ∗
and Π∗ are continuous mappings. To that end, we will show
that for any sequence ρn → ρ in uniform norm, we have
θ∗(ρn) → θ∗(ρ) in w-norm and Π∗(ρn) ⇒ Π∗(ρ) (where ⇒
denotes weak convergence). Finally, we use the continuity of
θ∗ and Π∗ to prove that F(ρn)→ F(ρ).
Step 1: Continuity of θ∗
Theorem 7. The map θ∗ is continuous.
Proof: Define the map V ∗ : P 7→ V that takes ρ to Vˆρ(·).
We begin by showing that ‖θˆρ1 − θˆρ2‖w ≤ K‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖w,
which means that the continuity of the map V ∗ implies the
continuity of the map θ∗.
Then we show two simple properties of the Bellman oper-
ator. The first is that for any ρ ∈ P and f1, f2 ∈ V ,
‖Tρf1 − Tρf2‖w ≤ Kˆ‖f1 − f2‖w (12)
for some large Kˆ, independent of ρ. This result is available
in Lemma 18 in Appendix B-A.
Second, let Tρ1 and Tρ2 be the Bellman operators corre-
sponding to ρ1, ρ2 ∈ P and let f ∈ V . We show that
‖Tρ1f − Tρ2f‖w ≤ 2(M − 1)K1‖f‖w‖ρ1 − ρ2‖. (13)
This result is available in Lemma 19 in Appendix B-A.
We then have
‖T jρ1 Vˆρ2 − T jρ2 Vˆρ2‖w ≤ ‖T jρ1 Vˆρ2 − T j−1ρ1 Tρ2 Vˆρ2‖w
+ ‖T j−1ρ1 Tρ2 Vˆρ2 − T j−2ρ1 T 2ρ2 Vˆρ2‖w + · · ·
+ ‖Tρ1T j−1ρ2 Vˆρ2 − T jρ2 Vˆρ2‖w
≤ Kˆj−1‖Tρ1 Vˆρ2 − Tρ2 Vˆρ2‖w + · · ·
+ ‖Tρ1T j−1ρ2 Vˆρ2 − T jρ2 Vˆρ2‖w (14)
≤ (Kˆj−1 + · · ·+ 1)‖Tρ1 Vˆρ2 − Tρ2 Vˆρ2‖w
≤ 2(M − 1)K‖ρ1 − ρ2‖(Kˆj−1 + · · ·+ 1)‖Vˆρ2‖w (15)
Here, (14) and (15) follow from (12) and (13), respectively.
Now, let j be such that T jρ1 is an α-contraction, which is
guaranteed to exist by lemma 2. Note that Statement 1 of
Lemma 2 implies that such a j <∞ exists. Then we have
‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖w (16)
= ‖T jρ1 Vˆρ1 − T jρ2 Vˆρ2‖w
≤ ‖T jρ1 Vˆρ1 − T jρ1 Vˆρ2‖w + ‖T jρ1 Vˆρ2 − T jρ2 Vˆρ2‖w
=⇒ (1− α)‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖w ≤ ‖T jρ1 Vˆρ2 − T jρ2 Vˆρ2‖w
(17)
Finally, from (15) and (17), we get
‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖w (18)
≤ 2(m− 1)K(Kˆ
j−1 + · · ·+ 1)‖ρ1 − ρ2‖
1− α ‖Vˆρ2‖w
≤ 2(m− 1)K(Kˆ
j−1 + · · ·+ 1)‖ρ1 − ρ2‖
1− α
× (‖Vˆρ1‖w + ‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖w).
Therefore, if 2(m−1)K(Kˆ
j−1+···+1)
1−α ‖ρ1 − ρ2‖ < 12 , then
‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖w (19)
≤ 4(m− 1)K(Kˆ
j−1 + · · ·+ 1)
1− α ‖Vˆρ1‖w‖ρ1 − ρ2‖
Hence, the maps V ∗ and θ∗ are continuous.
Step 2: Continuity of the map Π∗
Let Πρ,θ(.) be the invariant distribution generated by any θ.
Recall that Π∗ takes ρ ∈ P to probability measure Πρ(.) =
Πρ,θˆρ(.). First, we show that Πρ,θ(.) ∈ Ω, where Ω is the space
of absolutely continuous measures (with respect to Lebesgue
measure) on R+.
Lemma 8. For any ρ ∈ P and any θ ∈ Θ, Πρ,θ(·) is
absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure
on R+.
Proof: Πρ,θ(·) can be expressed as the invariant queue-
length distribution of the dynamics
q →
{
Q′ +A with probability β
R with probability (1− β),
where A ∼ Φ and R ∼ Ψ, and Q′ is a random variable with
distribution generated by the conditional probabilities
P(Q′ = q|q) =1− pρ(θˆ(q))
P(Q′ = (q − 1)+|q) =pρ(θˆ(q))
7Let Π′ be the distribution of Q′. Then for any Borel set B, Π
can be expressed using the convolution of Π′ and Φ :
Πρ,θ(B) = β
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(B − y)dΠ′(y) + (1− β)Ψ(B). (20)
If B is a Lebesgue null-set, then so is B− y ∀y. So, Φ(B−
y) = 0 and Ψ(B) = 0 and therefore Πρ(B) = 0.
We now develop a useful characterization of Πρ,θ. Let
Υ
(k)
ρ,θ(B|q) = P(Qk ∈ B|no regeneration, Q0 = q)
be the distribution of queue length Qk at time k induced by
the transition probabilities (6) conditioned on the event that
Q0 = q and that there are no regenerations until time k. We
can now express the invariant distribution Πρ,θ(·) in terms of
Υ
(k)
ρ,θ(·|q) as in the following lemma.
Lemma 9. For any bid distribution ρ ∈ P and for any
stationary policy θ ∈ Θ, the Markov chain described by
the transition probabilities in (6) has a unique invariant
distribution Πρ,θ(·). Also Πρ,θ and Υ(k)ρ,θ are related as follows:
Πρ,θ(B) =
∑
k≥0
(1− β)βkEΨ(Υ(k)ρ,θ(B|Q)), (21)
where EΨ(Υ(k)ρ,θ(B|Q)) =
∫
Υ
(k)
ρ,θ(B|q)dΨ(q).
Proof: Υ(k)ρ,θ(B|q) is the queue length distribution assum-
ing no regeneration has happened yet, and the regeneration
event occurs with probability β independently of the rest of the
system. It is then easy to find Πρ,θ(B) in terms of Υ
(k)
ρ,θ(B|q)
by simply using the properties of the conditional expectation,
and the theorem follows. Note that in EΨ(Υ(k)ρ,θ(B|Q)), the
random variable is the initial condition of the queue, as
generated by Ψ. Full details are available in Appendix B-B.
We shall now prove the continuity of Π∗ in ρ.
Theorem 10. The mapping Π∗ : P 7→ Ω is continuous.
Proof: By Portmanteau theorem [20], we only need to
show that for any sequence ρn → ρ in w-norm and any open
set B, lim infn→∞Πρn(B) ≥ Πρ(B). By Fatou’s lemma,
lim inf
n→∞ Πρn(B) = lim infn→∞
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨR [Υ(k)ρn (B|Q)]
≥
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨR [lim infn→∞ Υ
(k)
ρn (B|Q)]
(22)
where Q ∼ ΨR. Let Υ(k)ρ = Υ(k)ρ,θˆρ . We prove in Lemma 20
(see Appendix B-B) that lim infn→∞Υ
(k)
ρn (B|q) ≥ Υ(k)ρ (B|q)
for every q ∈ R+, and the proof follows.
Step 3: Continuity of the mapping F
Now, using the results from Step 1 and Step 2, we establish
continuity of the mapping F . First, we show that F(ρ) ∈ P .
Lemma 11. For any ρ ∈ P , let γ(x) = (F(ρ))(x) =
Πρ(θˆ
−1
ρ ([0, x])), x ∈ R+. Then, γ ∈ P .
Proof: From the definition of Πρ, it is easy to see that γ
is a distribution function. Since θˆρ is continuous and strictly
increasing function as shown in Lemma 4, θˆ−1ρ ({x}) is either
empty or a singleton. Then, from Lemma 8, we get that
Πρ(θˆ
−1
ρ ({x})) = 0. Together, we get that γ(x) has no jumps
at any x and hence it is continuous.
To complete the proof, we need to show that the expected
bid under γ(.) is finite. In order to do this, we construct
a new random process Q˜k that is identical to the original
queue length dynamics Qk, except that it never receives any
service. We show that this process stochastically dominates
the original, and use this property to bound the mean of the
original process by a finite quantity independent of ρ. Full
details are presented in Appendix B-C.
We now have the main theorem.
Theorem 12. The mapping F : P 7→ P given by (F(ρ))(x) =
Πρ(θˆ
−1
ρ ([0, x])) is continuous.
Proof: Let ρn → ρ in uniform norm. From previous steps,
we have θˆρn → θˆρ in w-norm and Πρn ⇒ Πρ. Then, using
Theorem 5.5 of Billingsley [20], one can show that the push-
forwards also converge:
Πρn(θˆ
−1
ρn (·))⇒ Πρ(θˆ−1ρ (·)).
Then, F(ρn) converges point-wise to F(ρ) as it is continuous
at every x, i.e., (F(ρn))(x)→ (F(ρ))(x) for all x ∈ R+.
It is easy to show that in the norm space P , point-wise
convergence implies convergence in uniform norm. This result
is proved in Lemma 21 in Appendix B-C. This completes the
proof.
B. F(P) contained in a compact subset of P
We show that the closure of the image of the mapping F ,
denoted by F(P), is compact in P . As P is a normed space,
sequential compactness of any subset of P implies that the
subset is compact. Hence, we just need to show that F(P) is
sequentially compact. Sequential compactness of a set F(P)
means the following: if {ρn} ∈ F(P) is a sequence, then there
exists a subsequence {ρnj} and ρ ∈ F(P) such that ρnj → ρ.
We use Arzela`-Ascoli theorem and uniform tightness of the
measures in F(P) to show the sequential compactness. The
version that we will use is stated below:
Theorem 13 (Arzela`-Ascoli Theorem). Let X be a σ-compact
metric space. Let G be a family of continuous real valued func-
tions on X . Then the following two statements are equivalent:
1) For every sequence {gn} ⊂ G there exists a subsequence
gnj which converges uniformly on every compact subset
of X .
2) The family G is equicontinuous on every compact subset
of X and for any x ∈ X , there is a constant Cx such
that |g(x)| < Cx for all g ∈ G.
Suppose a family of functions D ⊆ P satisfies the equiva-
lent conditions of the Arzela´-Ascoli theorem and in addition
satisfy the uniform tightness property, i.e., ∀ > 0 there exists
and x such that for all f ∈ D 1 ≥ f(x) ≥ 1− . Then, for
any sequence {ρn} ⊂ D, there exists a subsequnce {ρnj} that
8converges uniformly on every compact set to a continuous
increasing function ρ on R+. As D is uniformly tight it
can be shown that ρnj converges uniformly to ρ and that
ρ ∈ P . Therefore, D is sequentially compact in the topology
of uniform norm.
In the following, we show that F(P) satisfies uniform
tightness property and condition 2 in Arzela´-Ascoli theorem.
First verifying the conditions of Arzela´-Ascoli theorem, note
that the functions in consideration are uniformly bounded by
1. To prove equicontinuity, consider a γ = F(ρ) and let x > y.
γ(x)− γ(y) = Πρ(θρ(q) ≤ x)−Πρ(θρ(q) ≤ y)
= Πρ(y < θρ(q) ≤ x) (23)
Lemma 14. For any interval [a, b], Πρ([a, b]) < c · (b − a),
for some large enough c.
Proof: The proof follows easily from our characterization
of Πρ in terms of Υ
(k)
ρ .
The above lemma and equation (23) imply that γ(x) −
γ(y) ≤ c(θ−1ρ (x) − θ−1ρ (y)). To show equicontinuity, it is
enough to show that lim supy↑x
γ(x)−γ(y)
x−y ≤ K(x) for some
K independent of ρ, which we will show now.
lim sup
y↑x
γ(x)− γ(y)
x− y = lim supy↑x
Πρ(y < θρ(q) ≤ x)
x− y
= lim sup
y↑x
Πρ
([
θ−1ρ (y), θ
−1
ρ (x)
])
x− y
≤ c lim sup
y↑x
θ−1ρ (x)− θ−1ρ (y)
x− y
= c lim sup
y↑x
θ−1ρ (x)− θ−1ρ (y)
θρθ
−1
ρ (x)− θρθ−1ρ (y)
Let x′ = θ−1ρ (x) and y
′ = θ−1ρ (y). Now,
lim sup
y↑x
γ(x)− γ(y)
x− y ≤ c lim supy′→x′
x′ − y′
θρ(x′)− θρ(y′)
= c lim sup
y′→x′
x′ − y′
β∆V (x′)− β∆V (y′)
≤ c lim sup
y′→x′
x′ − y′
β (∆C(x′)−∆C(y′))
≤ c 1
H(x′)
Where,
0 < H(x′) =
{
EA[C ′(x′ +A)− C ′(x− 1 +A)] x′ > 1
EA[C ′(x′ +A)] x′ ≤ 1
and C ′(x) = dC(x)dx .
Finally, we have the following lemma showing that F(P)
is uniformly tight.
Lemma 15. F(P) is uniformly tight, i.e., for any  > 0 and
any f ∈ F(P), there exists an x ∈ R such that 1 −  ≤
f(x) ≤ 1.
Proof: From Lemma 11, we have F(P) ⊆ P . Hence,
the expectation of the bid distributions in F(P) is bounded
uniformly. An application of Markov inequality will give
uniform tightness.
VI. APPROXIMATION RESULTS: PBE AND MFE
In this section we prove that the mean field policy is an
-Nash equilibrium. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 16. Let (ρ, θˆρ) constitute an MFE. Suppose at time 0
the queue length of the users is set independently across users
according to Πρ; and that their initial belief is also consistent.
Also, suppose that all queues except queue 1 play the MFE
policy θˆρ. Then, for any policy θN of queue 1 that may be
history dependent and any q ∈ R+, we have
lim sup
N→∞
V N1,µ1,0(q; θˆρ, (θˆρ)−1)− V N1,µ1,0(q; θN , (θˆρ)−1) ≤ 0,
where µ1,0 = Πρ and the superscript N has been added to
explicitly indicate the dependence on the number of cells.
The main idea behind the proof is a result called propa-
gation of chaos, and it identifies conditions under which any
finite subset of the state variables are independent from each
other. We state this result now in our context. We only provide
brief sketches of proofs in this section, since the methodology
is much the same as [21] and space constraints do not allow
us to present the full version of the proofs here.
Lemma 17 (Propagation of chaos). For any fixed indices
i1, . . . , ik, let L(QNi1 (t), . . . , QNik(t) denote the probability law
of the k-tuple of corresponding queues in the MN -queue
system, at time t. Suppose that L((QNi1 (0), . . . , QNik,0(0)) =
⊗kΠρ, where (ρ, θρ) is the solution to the MFE equation. Also,
suppose that all queues are following mean field equilibrium
strategy. Then for any T > 0, we have
L(QNi1 (T ), . . . , QNik(T )⇒ ⊗kΠρ,
as N →∞.
Proof: We shall only consider the case k = 2; the proof
of the general case is similar. We can follow the proof of
Theorems 4.1 and 5.1 in Graham and Meleard [21]. The proof
is divided into two parts; the first part proves that for any two
agents i and j,
‖L(QNi , QNj )− L(QNi )⊗ L(QNj )‖D → 0,
where the subscript D refers to the total variation norm. In
the second, we show that L(QNi ) ⇒ Πρ. Both parts rely on
studying interaction graphs, defined in [21], which characterize
the amount of interactions that any finite subset of agents may
have had in the past.
The proof of Theorem 16 is as follows. Suppose we start
at time t = 0 with queue length of agent 1 being Q1(0). We
can choose a time T large enough so that the value added
by auctions occurring after time T is less than , due to
discounting. Thus, the difference in value contributed by these
auctions, when using policy θN and θˆρ can be bounded by 2,
and we can restrict attention to the first T auctions.
Using ideas similar to Lemma 17, we show that probability
of the event EN that other agents that interact with agent 1
at time t have never been influenced by agent 1 goes to 1
9as N becomes large. Thus, the belief of distribution of queue
lengths of other agents encountered converges to Πρ according
to Lemma 17. Then we can show that for any  > 0 and N ,
V N1,µ1,0(q; θρ, (θρ)−1)− V N1,µ1,0(q; θN , (θρ)−1) ≤ ,
which yields the desired result.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
We now turn to computing the MFE distribution. We
simulate a large system with 100,000 users distributed among
10,000 cells with 10 users per cell. For simplicity of simula-
tion, we truncate and discretize both state and bid spaces. The
truncated state space is S = {0.01m, 0 ≤ m ≤ 2000}, while
the bid space is X = {0.15m, 0 ≤ m ≤ 3000}. The job arrival
and regeneration distributions are both chosen to be uniform
over interval [0, 1]. The service rate of each base station is
assumed to be 5 units per time slot. Finally, the holding cost
function is chosen as C(q) = q2.
Our simulation simply follows the choices made by each
agent and calculating the empirical distribution that would
result at each time step. Let ρ0(x) = min{0.001x, 1}, x inX
and Π0 = Ψ. For every positive integer n, do the following:
1) Compute the optimal value function, Vˆn, which is the
unique solution to the following equation,
Vˆn(q) = C(q)+βEA[Vˆn(q+A)]−
∑
x≤β∆Vˆn(q),x∈X
pρn(x),
where ∆Vˆn(q) = EA[Vˆn(q+A)]−EA[Vˆn((q−1)++A)].
We apply value iteration (Section 6.10 [22]) to compute
an approximate solution to the above equation.
2) Compute the optimal bid function, θˆn as
θˆn(q) = βEA[Vˆn(q +A)− Vˆn((q − 1)+ +A)].
3) Next, all agents employ the optimal bid policy from
Step 2 and update their states. Then we compute the
candidate steady state distribution by evaluating emper-
ical distribution of state.
4) Finally, compute the empirical bid distribution,
ρn+1(x) = Πn[θˆ
−1
n ([0, x])]. If ||ρn − ρn+1|| < , then
ρ = ρn+1 and exit. Otherwise, set n = n+ 1 and go to
Step 1.
If the algorithm converges, then its output distribution ρ, is an
approximation of the MFE bid distribution.
We simulated the algorithm for three set of parameters:
1. (β = 0.9,M = 10), 2. (β = 0.95,M = 10) and
3. (β = 0.9,M = 15). Also, we chose the accuracy parameter
 = 0.008. Figure 2 shows that the algorithm converges in
less than 20 iterations in all three cases. In each iteration,
Step 1 (value iteration) is the most computationally intensive.
It converges in 80 recursions, with each recursion having to
update |S| number of variables, and with each variable update
requiring at most |X | number of arithmetic operations. All
together, the computational complexity of each iteration is in
the order of 80× |S| × |X | arithmetic operations.
The queue length distributions at MFE are shown in Fig-
ure 3. We observe that the distribution curves exhibit a
rightward shift with increase in β or M . Note that larger β
makes queues live longer without regeneration, while higher
M reduces each individual’s average service rate. Hence,
the queues get longer on average. We show the optimal
bid functions at MFE in Figure 4. As expected from our
analysis, the bid functions are monotonically increasing in
queue length.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our algorithm for computing the MFE immediately suggests
a simple implementation scheme. Suppose each mobile device
has a network interface manager on which the human user sets
up priorities for different apps. The interface manager also
should be aware of the cost functions corresponding to the
QoE of different apps. Now, suppose that the base stations
were to calculate the empirical bid distribution at each time
instant, and return it to the interface manager. The interface
manager plays its best response to this bid distribution. Value
iteration could be done either on each device or at a data center
and provided as a look up table to the interface manager. The
base stations combine all the bids to create a new empirical
bid distribution. Such a proceeding is essentially identical to
the algorithm that we employed above, and would converge
in a similar fashion.
We had assumed a single cost function for the agent (app),
but as long as there are a finite set of cost functions (corre-
sponding to a finite number of app types) we can incorporate
the cost function as part of the state of the agent, with the
cost function being chosen according to some distribution at
each regeneration (corresponding to choosing to start a new
app with some probability). Such a modification causes no
changes to any of our analysis. Then the mean field bid
distribution accounts for the distribution of cost functions (app
popularities), and the agent takes a decision based on this
distribution as before. The only difference to the achieved
equilibrium is that it now follows a weighted version of LQF,
with the weights corresponding to the cost on QoE of the
competing apps.
To summarize our work, we explored the question of
whether it is possible to design an scheduling policy that
allows for declaration of value by humans in the loop and
effects on QoE, and which has the attractive properties of
a (weighted) LQF service regime. We used a mean field
framework to show that as the number of agents in the system
becomes large, this objective can indeed be fulfilled using a
second price auction at each server. Our design appears to lend
itself well to implementation and this will be our future goal.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We may rewrite the the definition of Tρ in (9) as
(Tρf)(q) = inf
x∈R+
Sf (q, x) (24)
where Sf (q, x) = C(q) + rρ(x) + βEQ1 [f(Q1)|q, x]. Given
the current state and action pair, (q, x), the first two terms
in Sf (q, x) constitute the current cost, while the last term is
the future expected cost, where Q1 is one-step future state
variable. Further, from (9), we have
EQ1 [f(Q1)|q, x] = (1− pρ(x)EA[f(q +A)]
+ pρ(x)EA[f((q − 1)+ +A].
The proof proceeds through a verification of the assumptions
of Theorem 8.3.6 in [19]. An exception is that action space
in our case is not a compact set which violates Assump-
tion 8.3.1(a) in [19]. However, this assumption can be overrid-
den if the statement of Lemma 8.3.8(a) in [19], equivalently
Condition (3) below, holds true. Further, we desire to show
the existence of a j ∈ N such that T jρ is a contraction
mapping. Since Theorem 8.3.6 is derived for j = 1, we replace
Assumption 8.3.2(b) with Condition (5) given below.
Now, we prove the following statements.
1) C(q) + rρ(x) is a continuous function in x ∈ R+.
2) EQ1 [f(Q1)|q, x] is continuous in x ∈ R+ for every f ∈
V .
3) For any f ∈ V , there exists a measurable function θf :
R+ → R+ such that θf (q) attains minimum in (24).
Further, Sf (q, θf (q)) is a measurable function for any
f ∈ V.
4) There exists a nonnegative constant c1 such that
supx |C(q) + rρ(x)| ≤ c1w(q) where w(q) =
max{C(q), 1}.
5) There exists j ∈ N and c2 with c2 < 1 such that
βj sup~x EQj [w(Qj)|q, ~x] ≤ c2w(q) + c3 where Qj is
j-step future state variable and ~x is a j-length sequence
of actions.
6) The function E[w(Q1)|q, x] is continuous in x ∈ R+
Conditions (1) and (2) are obvious from the continuity of
rρ(x) and pρ(x). Further, as derived in (10), θf (q) = ∆f(q)+
where ∆f(q) = EA(f(q + A) − f((q − 1)+ + A)). The
measurability of functions θf (q) and Sf (q, θ(q)) are evident
from their definitions. Condition (4) holds true from the
definition of w(q) and from the fact that
rρ(x) ≤ lim
y→∞ rρ(y) < (M−1)
∫ ∞
0
(1−ρ(x))dx < (M−1)E
where the last inequality follows as ρ ∈ P . Condition (5)
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follows from the fact that,
βjEQj [w(Qj)|q, ~x] ≤ βj max{1, C(q + jA¯)}
≤ βj(k1w(q) + k2),
where A¯, as defined in Assumption 1, is the maximum arrival
possible between any two adjacent auctions and k1 > 0, k2 are
some constants independent of j. The above results follows
from (25) and the definition of w(q). Then, there exists a j
such that βjk1 = c2 < 1 and hence (5) holds. Finally, the last
condition follows from Condition (2) as w(q) ∈ V .
Given that the above conditions are met, we can prove the
first statement of Lemma 2. The proof is essentially identical
to that of Theorem 8.3.6 in [19]. The second statement of the
lemma can be obtained by comparing (9) and (7). The last
part of the lemma follows from (10).
APPENDIX B
PROOFS FROM SECTION V
In this section, we present details of proofs that were
omitted from Section V. We divide this section into parts based
on the development of that section.
A. Proofs Pertaining to Section V-A: Step 1
Lemma 18. Suppose ρ1, ρ2 ∈ P . Then, ‖θˆρ1 − θˆρ2‖w ≤
K‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖w
Proof: For any q ∈ R+, by the definition of θˆρ we have,
|θˆρ1(q)− θˆρ2(q)|
=|β[EA[Vˆρ1(q +A)− Vˆρ1((q − 1)+ +A)
− Vˆρ2(q +A) + Vˆρ2((q − 1)+ +A)]]|
≤βEA|Vˆρ1(q +A)− Vˆρ2(q +A)|
+ βEA|Vˆρ1((q − 1)+ +A)− Vˆρ2((q − 1)+ +A)|
≤β‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖wEA(w(q +A) + w((q − 1)+ +A))
≤K‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖ww(q)
Lemma 19. Let ρ ∈ P and f1, f2 ∈ V . Then,
‖Tρf1 − Tρf2‖w ≤ Kˆ‖f1 − f2‖w (25)
Proof: Using the characterization of Tρ from eq. (11), we
have that, for any q ∈ R+
|Tρf1(q)− Tρf2(q)|
≤β‖f1 − f2‖K1w(q) +
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ β∆f1(q)
β∆f2(q)
|ρM−1(u)| du
∣∣∣∣∣
≤β‖f1 − f2‖K1w(q) + β|∆f1(q)−∆f2(q)|
≤β(K1 +K2)‖f1 − f2‖w(q)
B. Proofs Pertaining to Section V-A: Step 2
Proof of Lemma 9: For brevity, denote Πρ,θ(·) be Π(·)
and Υ(k)ρ,θ = Υ
(k) . Let −τ be the last time before 0 the chain
regenerated. We have
Π(B) =
∞∑
k=0
P(B, τ = k) (26)
=
∞∑
k=0
P(τ = k)P(B|τ = k) (27)
Since the regeneration events are independent of the queue-
length and occur geometrically with probability (1−β), P(τ =
k) = (1− β)βk. Hence,
Π(B) =
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkP(Q0 ∈ B|τ = k) (28)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkE(E(1Q0∈B |τ = k,Q−k = Q)|τ = k)
(29)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkE(Υ(k)(B|Q)|τ = k) (30)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨR(Υ(k)(B|Q)). (31)
since Q−k ∼ ΨR given τ = k.
Lemma 20. lim infn→∞Υ
(k)
ρn (B|q) ≥ Υ(k)ρ (B|q)
Proof: The proof proceeds through mathematical induc-
tion on k. For k = 0, we have Υ(0)ρn (B|q) = 1(q∈B) and
hence the hypothesis holds true. Suppose that the hypothesis
is true till k = m − 1. To prove the lemma, we just need to
verify that the hypothesis holds for k = m. Let Pq,ρ(.) be the
one step transition kernel of the queue dynamics conditioned
on the following facts: the initial state is q, the bids are
generated according to the optimal policy given by Corollary 3
and no regeneration. Verify that Pq,ρn(·) =⇒ Pq,ρ(·) by
considering the integrals of a bounded continuous function.
Then, by Skorokhod representation theorem, there exists Xn
and X on common probability space such that Xn ∼ Pq,ρn ,
X ∼ Pq,ρ and Xn → X a.s. We have,
lim inf Υ(m)ρn (B|qn) = lim inf E(Υ(m−1)ρn (B|Xn)) (32)
≥E(lim inf Υ(m−1)ρn (B|Xn)) (33)
≥E(Υ(m−1)ρ (B|X)) (34)
=Υ(m)ρ (B|q), (35)
where eq. (33) follows from Fatou’s lemma, and eq. (34)
follows from the induction hypothesis.
C. Proofs Pertaining to Section V-A: Step 3
Details of proof of Lemma 11: To complete the proof,
we need to show that the expected bid under the cumulative
distribution function ρˆ is bounded from above by a constant
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that is independent of ρˆ. To that end, define a new Markov
random process Q˜k with the probability transition matrix
P(Q˜k+1 ∈ B|Q˜k = q) = β1(q+A¯∈B) + (1− β)ΨR(B) (36)
where A¯ is the maximum possible arrival between any two
consecutive auction instants. The process Q˜k has an invariant
distribution which is given by,
Π˜(B) =
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨR(1(q+kAˆ)∈B). (37)
The proof of the above result is identical to that of Lemma 9.
For any q given, the above probability measure (36) stochas-
tically bounds the probability measure in eq. (6). Therefore,
it can be shown that Π˜ stochastically dominates Πρ for all
ρ ∈ P , i.e, Πρ 4 Π˜.
Now, the expected value of the optimal bid function θˆρ(q)
under Πρ satisfies,
EΠρ [θˆρ(q)] ≤EΠ˜[θˆρ(q)] (38)
≤EΠ˜[Vˆρ(q + A¯)] (39)
≤
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨR(Vˆρ(q + (k + 1)A¯)) (40)
Above, the first inequality follows from stochastic dominance
of Π˜ and the second inequality is due to the definition of
optimal bid function.
From (7), we can observe that for any ρ, Vˆρ(q) ≤∑∞
k=0 β
kC(q + kA¯) independent of ρ. Since C(q) ∈ O(qm)
for some m, we have Vˆρ(q) ∈ O(qm). Then, EΨR(Vˆρ(q +
(k + 1)Aˆ)) ∈ O(km) as the moments of ΨR are bounded.
This directly gives that EΠρ [θˆρ(q)] is bounded by the some
constant that is independent of ρ and, hence independent of
ρˆ.
Lemma 21. In P , pointwise convergence implies uniform
convergence.
Proof: Let ρn, ρ ∈ P and ρn → ρ point-wise. Given
 > 0, choose L large enough so that ρ(L) > 1− . Since ρ is
continuous function by definition, it is uniformly continuous
on the compact set [0, L]. Therefore, we can construct a
sequence 0 = x1 < x2 < · · · < xk = L such that and
|ρ(xi+1) − ρ(xi)| < . Let J be large enough so that for all
n > J , |ρ(xi) − ρn(xi)| <  for all i. For any y such that
xi < y < xi+1,
|ρ(y)− ρn(y)| (41)
<|ρ(y)− ρ(xi)|+ |ρ(xi)− ρn(xi)| (42)
+ |ρn(y)− ρn(xi)|
<|ρ(xi+1)− ρ(xi)|+ |ρ(xi)− ρn(xi)| (43)
+ |ρn(xi+1)− ρn(xi)|
<2|ρ(xi+1)− ρ(xi)|+ |ρ(xi)− ρn(xi)|+ 2 (44)
<5 (45)
While if L < y, then
|ρ(y)− ρn(y)| (46)
< |ρ(y)− ρn(L)|+ |ρn(L)− ρ(L)|+ |ρ(y)− ρ(L)| (47)
< 1− ρ(L) + + + 1− ρ(L) (48)
< 4. (49)
Therefore, |ρ(y) − ρn(y)| < 5 for all n > J and hence ρn
converges to ρ uniformly.
D. Proofs Pertaining to Section V-B
Proof of Lemma 14: We know that Π([a, b]|ρ, θ) =∑
k≥0(1 − β)βkEΨR(Υ(k)ρ ([a.b]|Q0)). Let Ak be the net
arrivals and Dk be the net departures till time k. Then,
Υ(k)ρ ([a, b]|Q0) = E(1(Q0+Ak−Dk∈[a,b])|Q0) (50)
= E(E(1(Q0+Ak−Dk∈[a,b])|Dk, Q0)|Q0)
(51)
= E(E(1(Ak∈[a−Q0+Dk,b−Q0+Dk])|Q0, Dk)|Q0)
(52)
≤ c1 · (b− a). (53)
The above results hold since the random variable Ak is
independent of Q0 and Dk for any k and it has a bounded
density function. Therefore, EΨR(Υ
(k)
ρ ([a.b]|Q0)) ≤ c·(b− a)
for all k > 0. For k = 0, we know that ΨR has a bounded
density which implies ΨR([a, b]) ≤ c1ψ · (b − a). These
two results prove that there is a large enough c such that
Πρ([a, b]) < c · (b− a).
